


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The insides of a best-seller dismantled with greater care than they had been put together.

A BAD BOOK BY ANDREW TULLY

Sherman Kent

with

Wilma Slautterback

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During the evening of 7 March 1962 the author of *CIA: The Inside Story*¹ appeared on Mike Wallace's TV program at Station WNEW New York. After some introductory remarks and some chitchat on the Agency and its doings Wallace put the question, "Why did you go ahead and write the book?" Mr. Tully replied, "... we have here an organization which spends up to a billion dollars a year and it makes mistakes . . . that in the past have all but led us into war. For that reason I thought it was time to write a book about the CIA to let the people know something about this organization." On three other occasions Mr. Tully said substantially the same thing in replies to Barry Gray (WMCA radio, New York, 8 January 1962), Patty Cavin (WRC radio, Washington, 15 January 1962), and Steve Allison (WWDC radio, Washington, 16 April 1962), reiterating that "the tax payers are paying up to a billion dollars a year on this organization and I think the public should know something about it."

Much can be said of Mr. Tully's book, and indeed much will be in the pages that follow, but here at the beginning of things let me inform the reading taxpayer that if he wants to know what he is getting for the "billion dollars a year" Mr. Tully speaks about, the last place in the world to look is in Mr. Tully's volume. Mr. Allen Dulles—who should be in a

¹ New York: William Morrow, 1962.

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position to know—shares these sentiments; in a letter to the publishers commenting on the book he wrote:

The Tully book, in my opinion, does not contain "the facts" about the C.I.A. In part it is a compilation of rumor, hearsay and republication of previously published speculation about the C.I.A. Much of the book is fiction. In its description of C.I.A. activities it contains gross inaccuracies and distortions. Some statements in the book are repetition of Communist propaganda which over the years has been directed toward the destruction of C.I.A. by Moscow and other Communist centers.²

Mr. Dulles must have used the greatest forbearance in confining himself to these words. He might have gone on to say that the book contains more factual errors than any other book he had ever read, that large sections of it were plagiarized and often from poor and faulty stuff, that the fantasies he noted were all but certainly introduced in a disingenuous attempt to give the book its so-called "inside" character, and that in cases where there may have been some solid source material Mr. Tully quoted it either inaccurately or with gratuitous embellishments. He could have given chapter and verse to the point that Mr. Tully repeated Communist canards on the Agency which have no relation whatever to the truth.

Not that it is easy to do a good book on the operations of a secret organization past or present. Scholars and reputable journalists for long have shied away from undertaking such tasks because of the nature of the source material. If an organization is truly secret it does not leave behind much of an open record. See what you can find out about the Italian Carbonari, the secret German student organizations, or the French secret societies of the early 19th century. If you want to find out about any present-day secret intelligence organization you have, to be sure, words to read and perhaps people to interview, but little stuff of substance. CIA is a good case in point.

For example there is a little solid material like the National Security Act of 1947 and its relevant amendments which give the legislative bones of the organization. There are some on-

² Quoted by Jack Raymond in the *New York Times* book review section of 28 January 1962.

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the-record congressional hearings in which witnesses discuss this Agency among other things. There are some guarded press releases from the White House or Department of State which bear on CIA doings, and some rare public utterances of Agency officers. There may be some purposeful leaks, not always easy to identify as such. This is about all that there is in the way of primary material, and as you can observe not all of it is forthright fact.

There are, however, moments in the life of a secret organization which produce a lot of writing about it. If it embarks upon an activity which not only goes awry but does so in such a fashion that its role becomes known—like CIA's in the matters of Cuba and the U-2—there is of course a spate of literature. If there are bitter recriminations many people may talk to the press. However, the Agency's policy and indeed government policy is one of not publicly setting the record straight even in such events. Thus while there is no dearth of what could be called information, what gets into print is a confused collection of truth, rumor, falsehood, contradiction, fantasy, and half-truth. A discriminating and careful student can perhaps reconstruct the thread of verity in this conglomeration, and if he also has the journalist's contacts and skill to exploit them he may come close to the whole story of what happened.

At about this point there is a cut-off of even this type of information. What remains is a mishmash of almost everything. Some of it starts when a newspaperman gets on the trail of a secret agency operative who is misbehaving or has stubbed his toe, some of it when an ex-employee (frequently but not always disgruntled) talks out of school, some of it when someone in the know yields to the temptation to be important at a cocktail party. Some secrets just seep into the public domain with the passage of time, and have happen to them what happens to anything that seeps. Many of the molecules get stuck on the way, many take on the constituents of the various media they pass through, a lot of foreign matter is dislodged and joins the flow. What started as water, say, will not come through as crude oil, but it may look like pretty strong coffee. Some alleged CIA secrets are just plain Communist fabrications, having originated in books and

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pamphlets bearing the imprint of Moscow, Prague, and East Berlin. They are invariably a verbal contribution to the Soviet campaign to stymie or destroy the Agency.

All the above is the tired old space garbage that circles in the wake of a secret organization. It passes from journalist to propagandist to journalist again and loses nothing on the trip. No careful and critical workman is going to try to write a serious book from such materials any more than an architect would undertake to build a hospital out of materials found on the city dump.

Almost by definition then, a book proclaiming itself "CIA: The Inside Story" is doomed before it is written. This one was. It is a bad book, a shoddy piece of goods. From the purely technical point of view it is by all odds the worst bad book that this reviewer has ever encountered.

Mr. Tully Gives the Facts

To begin with, it contains more errors of fact than one would believe possible. Take the rendering of people's names as a starter. You would think that an author who knows that the new CIA building is in Langley would know how to spell the names of: Maurice Couve de Murville (chap. 4, a dozen times), Bulganin (p. 175), Abdul Karim Kassem (p. 73), Gamal Abdul Nasser (pp. 100, 104), Prince Boun Oum (p. 217), Pal Maletier (pp. 171, 172), Prince Souphannouvong (pp. 211, 212, 214), Edouard or Edward Ochab (p. 174), Reinhard Gehlen (p. 156, twice), Ellis Dresel (p. 37), Hugh Latimer Dryden (p. 120), J. Henry Schroder (pp. 38, 39, 91), Clarence Leonard Johnson (p. 113), Selim Fakri (p. 79), Fuad or Fouad Chehab (p. 86), Adel Osseiran (p. 86), Ghazi Daghistani (p. 80), Albert Kalonji (p. 220), Sekou Touré (p. 221), Justin Bomboko (p. 222), and Rajeshwar Dayal (p. 225). The names of Orientale Province, Elisabethville, Poznan, Phong Saly, Sam Neua, and the Neo Lao Hak Xat also give this author trouble, and these are not all that do.

Do not zip past the foregoing paragraph. Think a minute before you read on, to realize that these names are not those of just anybody but of the French foreign minister, of the one-time number one man of the USSR, of the presidents of Iraq, Guinea, and the United Arab Republic, of the hero of the Hungarian revolt, of a past and of the present prime minister of

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Laos, of the chief of the German intelligence service, and of comparably prominent men and things.

As for errors more substantive than mere misspellings, they abound. Many of these touch matters that must remain secret; dangerous as such errors are, it would be more harmful to the national interest to correct them publicly. I shall not comment, for example, on Mr. Tully's allegation that in U.S. diplomatic missions abroad CIA's men outnumber the Foreign Service officers. But you do not have to be on the inside of CIA or in the know of secrets to recognize the many other misstatements he makes. As you read the formidable list that follows, you will perceive that a close look at *The World Almanac* would have obviated a good part of them. Practically all the rest could have been corrected in a morning at the public library. A few days there would have contributed to reducing the number of inaccurate generalizations—a matter which this list scarcely touches.

P. 9. President Truman did not "sit down and dictate the identical letters." The letter was prepared in the Bureau of the Budget.

P. 10. In 1947 there was no "Army Air Corps."

Pp. 11-12. The confusion at issue is not helped by misquotation from the National Security Act of 1947.

P. 15. "Those legislators who pass on CIA appropriations . . ." are *not* unaware of how the CIA budget is concealed in the national budget.

P. 23. CIA bothers with plenty of students who have not been in the upper 10% of their class.

Pp. 36-7. In the original document the word British is not spelled with a lower-case B.

P. 37. Mr. Dulles did not make several trips to Germany with Mr. Dresel nor did he see "a great deal of the German industrialists and generals . . ."

Pp. 38-9. The paragraphs relating to the Schroeders is a tissue of confused error.

a. The British and American companies bore the name Schroder, not Schroeder.

b. The American house is known as the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.

c. The American house is an affiliate of a London firm originally known as J. Henry Schroder & Company.

d. The German firm with which Baron Kurt von Schroeder is identified had no connection with the British Schroder house other than normal banking relations. In any case it was certainly not one of the great German banking houses.

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P. 39. William J. Donovan was not picked to head OSS but its predecessor organization as Coordinator of Information.

P. 40. The Hohenlohe mentioned as an acquaintance of Mr. Dulles in 1916 was a different member of that large family from the one associated with his name in February 1943.

P. 41. Mr. Dulles did not do business with the "Nazi plotters."

P. 41. The OSS code was not broken.

P. 42. The recommendations of the so-called Dulles Committee affected far more than the Central Intelligence Agency.

P. 43. Mr. Dulles did not become Director three years after joining CIA.

P. 53. There were no "CIA operatives who . . . led the Challe rebels to believe that the US looked with favor on their adventure."

P. 55. MI-5 is wrong here and on p. 263.

P. 64. Typewriters, needless to say, are not locked up in safes to preserve the security of the ribbon.

P. 66. There were no B-26's on either side in the Guatemalan revolution.

P. 70. CIA did not "fail to understand the psychology of the green and untried Caracas police force."

P. 73. Kassem was not helped to power by the Communists.

P. 74. In 1899 no one knew that there was oil in Kuwait. To link the British Kuwait treaty of that year with oil is ridiculous.

P. 78. If Eugene Burns was a founder of the "American Friends of the Far East" it is a well-kept secret. His interests in the Middle East are well known.

P. 79. The Kassem regime never claimed, as alleged by Tully, that Mr. Burns was a CIA agent nor was he a marked man. His death was the result of an irrational mob action for which the Kassem government subsequently expressed regrets and ultimately paid some \$50,000 compensation to his survivors.

P. 78. No Iraqi mob led by Communists or anyone else took violent action against CIA.

P. 79. Kassem did not go to *any* American war college.

P. 80. There were not "a series of revolts on the part of various tribes" after Kassem's takeover. It seems likely these allegations are a garbled version of the Mosul revolt, an urban affair in which Kurdish tribes were involved but involved on the side of the Kassem regime.

P. 82. July 1958, not June 1958.

P. 82. The Hashemite genealogy is all mixed up. Sherif Hussein had four sons, not two, and King Hussein of Jordan was the grandson of Abdullah, not the son.

P. 87. Chamoun did not fall with the evacuation of US forces. He had fallen several weeks before this event.

P. 90. Reza Pahlavi was not "an illiterate officer" in the Iranian army. He did *not* "take over in 1921 as Minister of War." He did *not* "proclaim himself Shahinshah in 1926."

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P. 92. The hyperbole about a traffic jam in Teheran caused by the influx of Soviet agents and CIA officers is the "ludicrous" part of this sentence.

P. 93. Mr. Dulles' trip to Europe in August 1953 had no connection with the Iranian situation, nor did Mr. Dulles see Princess Ashraf, nor did she come to the "same Swiss resort."

P. 94. The principal Soviet response to Schwartzkopf's visit to Iran was one broadcast beamed to Iranians. Does this constitute "Russian fuming over [his] presence?"

P. 95. Schwartzkopf had left Iran some 13 days before the time when Mr. Tully alleges he acted "as paymaster for CIA." The rest of the sentence is equally erroneous.

P. 96. Mossadegh's troops did not fight fiercely, nor for "nine hours." Mossadegh was *not* captured in the "palace."

P. 100. The Agency had no role in the fall of Farouk. The middle paragraph of p. 101 and indeed practically all of what follows about CIA in Egypt is pure fabrication.

P. 105. A tiny fraction of what Mr. Tully erroneously names Nasser's Free Officer Corps was the inner group actually responsible for the coup.

P. 107. At the time of the assassination attempt in Alexandria Nasser was not hit. Needless to say he was not "wounded in the shoulder."

P. 111. There was no mysterious letter from Bulganin to the White House.

P. 112. The U-2 group did not bear the name "10-10 Reconnaissance Detachment." Its identity was not Top Secret. It issued orders under its official title and its personnel acknowledged openly their affiliation with the unit.

P. 112. The U-2 could not take pictures "from 15 miles above the earth," nor from 17 miles as stipulated two pages later.

P. 113. The U-2 was designed in 1954, not 1953. This and other information relating to construction and first flight became public even before NBC's White Paper, "The U-2 Story."

P. 113. The relationship between the U-2 and the XF-104 is hopelessly garbled.

P. 113. The designer's name is Clarence Leonard Johnson. Kelly is a nickname.

P. 113. The U-2's wing span was not "more than 80 feet . . ."

P. 114. The "pogo—a wheel on a stick" was not attached "to each wing tip," but some 20 feet inboard from the tip. This information is all in the public domain.

P. 114. The pilot's helmet was not "sealed to his body which meant that he could neither eat or drink before or during a flight." The helmet was much like that used by the Mercury astronauts who, of course, are able to eat and drink.

P. 115. The pilots and their wives did not live "in mystery and seclusion for nearly four years."

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P. 115. The only published article from the Soviet press which gives a title to the U-2 calls it "the Prima donna of Espionage," not the "Black Lady of Espionage." By "a British flight magazine" I presume Mr. Tully means the British magazine *Flight*, which had published several articles on the U-2 prior to the 1959 crash. The first of these articles appeared in November 1956. In these circumstances Mr. Tully's use of the word "meanwhile" is scarcely appropriate.

P. 116. Powers' plane was not equipped with a mechanism which could destroy the plane in the event of forced landing.

P. 116. Powers was familiar with Bodo airport, but not because of "having flown there . . . during one of his reconnaissance missions."

P. 118. There was no ground-to-air contact with Powers or his plane. The allegation that Powers "radioed that there had been a flameout" is ridiculous.

P. 120. The No. 1 and No. 2 men of NASA do not bear the titles Director and Deputy Director respectively.

P. 121. The meeting of 1 May began many hours before nightfall.

P. 134. The Sverdlovsk flight was not referred to by U-2 pilots as "the milk run."

Pp. 135-147. Lest the reader perceive that I note no errors for Chapter 10 it is because the first half seems to be made up entirely of whole cloth and the second half cribbed in large part from the testimony which Richard Helms, a high officer of the CIA, gave before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.³ Helms, a careful workman, made no errors that I can find and accordingly these pages of the book are among its most convincing.

P. 148. The house which Mr. Dulles occupied, "Highlands," was located on "busy Wisconsin Avenue," but, as any Washington resident should know, it was at least a mile north of the northern boundary of "Washington's Georgetown section."

P. 149. The institution in question was not the Intelligence Advisory Council.

P. 150. The estimates cited are National Intelligence Estimates produced as a collective intelligence community operation and concurred in by all of the chiefs of the various intelligence services.

P. 158. Gehlen did not assume Otto John's job upon the latter's departure from the scene.

P. 160. General Trudeau was not the commander who spear-headed MacArthur's drive to take Manila.

Pp. 163-4. There is absolutely no evidence that CIA was involved in the East German insurrection of June 1953 nor can there be any basis for deducing such a connection.

³ *Communist Forgeries . . . Testimony of Richard Helms . . . June 2, 1961.*

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P. 165. Concessions to the East German workers were made *before* the riots took place, not after.

P. 165. Soviet troops were not "moved into Berlin at 6:30 next morning" i.e., 18 June. They arrived on the 17th.

P. 167. The situation in Hungary was not virtually identical to that in East Germany.

P. 167. It is by no means "a virtual certainty that CIA managed to smuggle arms to the [Hungarian] rebels and generally gave them assistance before the uprising." This is a flat error. This goes also for the allegation on the next page that CIA supplied arms and counsel which helped the Hungarian people to prepare themselves for the big day.

P. 168. Gero was not more moderate than Rakosi. That was his big trouble. He was born and bred a Stalinist diehard.

P. 169. In these circumstances one may wonder who the CIA experts were who "felt Gero would do something about the Hungarian people's grievances."

P. 170. There is great confusion here in the events of the revolutionary day in Budapest and in the order of their happening.

P. 170. It has never been established that any elements of the Hungarian army came over to the side of the insurgents as organized units.

P. 170. "The job of bringing the Hungarian government to its knees" was not "done in five days . . ." It took about ten.

P. 171. The detail of Nagy assuming office is in the wrong time bracket.

P. 171. One thing may be said of Nagy—he did not lack courage.

P. 171. Kadar was not Minister of the Interior at the time.

P. 172. Suslov has never been head of the Soviet secret police. Mr. Tully has apparently confused him with Serov, who was head of the Soviet secret police and who did appear in Hungary at a later stage.

P. 173. Nagy was not executed until the following summer.

P. 174. Gomulka was not in a situation to do much prodding of the Polish Communist leadership before mid-1956. He was not re-admitted to the party until August of that year, a date erroneously cited as July 1955. Poznan riots took place in June 1956, not June 1955, but Gomulka was then in no position to help arrange the trial of the rioters. In fact he probably had nothing to do with the trial at all.

P. 175. The showdown which Mr. Tully mentions in paragraph 2 occurred on 19 October 1956, not 19 September 1956.

P. 175. What CIA is alleged to have reported on the basis of its espionage came from the Western—particularly the French and German—press.

P. 175. The meeting of Polish party leaders was called to elect Gomulka to top party leadership and kick out Rokossovsky, not "to plan steps for further 'liberalization' of the regime . . ."

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P. 176. The "troops which Rokossovsky had started toward Warsaw" were not Soviet—they were Polish.

P. 177. Perhaps the biggest bouquet CIA will ever receive, and unfortunately cannot claim, is the credit Mr. Tully gives it here. In reality the phenomenon in question is deathless, enduring, and heroic Polish nationalism.

P. 178-195. No errors are noted in this chapter (13) for the reason that the bulk of the material is lifted bodily from the Truman *Memoirs*⁴ and congressional hearings.

P. 198. Sebald did not resign for the reason that he was not ambassador at the time.

P. 201. The elaborate cover operation mentioned at the top of the page was not set up on the offshore islands.

P. 201. "Whole battalions of Nationalist guerrillas" did not take part in the sorties.

P. 208. No Chinese Communist troops engaged in "direct military action" in Indochina and there had not been any evidence of an infiltration of Chinese Communist troops when Tully went to press.

P. 208. Whatever Dienbienphu was in this context, it should not be termed a city. History will know it as a large and predominantly flat rural area of many square miles that takes its name from the small town which was a French administrative seat.

P. 209. CIA did not estimate "that the attack on Dienbienphu would be timed with the fixing of the date in Berlin for the Indochinese peace talks in Geneva."

P. 209. Mr. Tully indicates that "CIA's estimates were disregarded." There is a strong implication that the party who disregarded them was the French. Does Mr. Tully believe that the French government is on the mailing list for "CIA estimates?"

P. 209. The figure of \$300,000,000 a year is wrong and wrong on the high side by a factor of almost 10.

P. 210. The Geneva Conference occurred in 1954, not 1955. The agreements signed at Geneva ultimately resulted in "a Communist North Vietnam . . ." To use the word "created" gives a totally erroneous impression.

P. 210. General Phoumi is not a first cousin of Marshal Sarit. The kinship is as distant as fifth or sixth cousin. Thai is not the country's [Laos] "principal language."

P. 211. The Pathet Lao did not receive "from Red China . . . supplies and technical aid." These of course came from North Vietnam.

P. 214. The group which CIA is alleged to have been backing, in the last line, was a group composed mostly of civilians.

⁴ Volume One, *Year of Decisions*, and Volume Two, *Years of Trial and Hope*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955 and 1956 respectively.

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P. 215. General Phoumi did not organize the CDNI. Incidentally, although the "group of militarists" mentioned at the bottom of page 214 and the CDNI at the top of page 215 are one and the same organization, Mr. Tully's presentation obscures this fact.

P. 215. No "delegation [of CIA men] was sent to confer with Kong Le."

P. 220. The time interval of the first full paragraph begins in the period before Congo independence. Van der Meersch, the "Belgian resident minister," was not there. He did not arrive until 12 days after independence. Furthermore, he returned to Brussels two days later without having seen Kasavubu.

P. 221. Lumumba's request to the UN did not bear on the matter of technical assistance in "reorganizing the Congolese armed forces" as the sentence at the top of the page seems to imply.

Pp. 234-5. The story of "Eugene Nicolai Maki's" defection in Paris is a complete fabrication. It contains not a grain of fact.

P. 235. Allen Dulles did not meet Hayhanen when the latter "arrived in New York by plane."

Pp. 243-256. Almost every reference to CIA in this chapter is incorrect.

P. 245. The scale of Manolo Ray's resistance organization in Cuba is grossly overstated.

P. 247. CIA did not pick the Cuban invasion leader. The characterization of Arttime is wrong.

P. 252. Mr. Dulles did *not* predict uprisings in Cuba.

P. 255. Mr. Dulles was not at the White House meeting of 18 April 1961.

P. 258. CIA has not had resources "up to \$1 billion a year . . ."

The above we can call errors—some are simple inaccuracies, some downright howlers. The list is not complete, for there are more which it would be impolitic to notice. Moreover, the list does not include that class of misstatement which while partaking of the nature of error is so gross a form that it must be treated as something apart. I refer of course to those passages that possess not an atom of truth, that are nothing but the inventions of Mr. Tully or of the authors he so often draws upon.

Tall Tales New and Old

Perhaps a little note on the verso of the title page is supposed to take care of this sort of thing. It reads, "In a few cases, fictitious names have been used and operational methods have been disguised—for obvious reasons of security.—AT." Whatever its purpose, this note, as the reader will perceive, cannot be made to apply to the matters below.

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Consider the opening paragraphs of the book. There is a deal more fiction here than the names and the so-called operational methods. It is all fiction. Or take page 21 on the Soviet aluminum coat hanger. Through clandestine procurement of this item and its analysis CIA is alleged to have been able to find out what a Soviet "bomber wing was made of, and from there it took only a few more steps to figure out both the range and the bomb load of that particular plane." This particular piece of balderdash first appeared in *Newsweek*,⁵ but since Mr. Tully does not refer to the source he has made the story his own. Is it possible that he could have believed it? Why didn't he talk with a technical man and then have some fun with *Newsweek*?

Or take the scene set in Stettin (pp. 62-3), where Mr. Tully believes there to have been a CIA agent operating under cover as a German businessman. In these paragraphs Mr. Tully's information is presumably of the most detailed: the man was tall and angular; he was newly arrived; the machine tool factory he took over was small; the spring days of April were balmy; the man was in the habit of putting up his lunch in a paper bag and strolling on a hill top—which was bucolic and which overlooked the wharves; he was a nature lover; he owned a pair of field glasses; he observed the birds in the trees, and from time to time he took a casual peep at the river-front piers. One afternoon he dictated a letter which was long and statistics-filled to his secretary who was a blonde, and so on and so on. All this detail sounds fine, but the fact is that the entire story is made of dreams. If Mr. Tully had set the scene on Mars the story would perhaps have been less convincing but no closer to the truth. That Mr. Tully has cribbed the incident from the Harknesses⁶ does not exculpate him. He apparently wants you to think that the story is the fruit of his own diligent research, for here again there is no mention of his debt to another.

Or take the pages in which Mr. Tully rehearses the fall of King Farouk of Egypt and the emergence of Naguib and ultimately Nasser. Throughout these stirring events CIA, ac-

⁵ 8 May 1961 (pp. 29-38). See p. A24 below.

⁶ Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," *Saturday Evening Post* (30 Oct., 6 Nov., 13 Nov. 1954). See p. A26 below.

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According to Mr. Tully, is the unseen hand that manipulated the whole thing. If he got these notions from his reading I have not yet discovered his source, but wherever it came from it is just plain fantasy.

Consider the incident alleged to have taken place in Moscow (pp. 135-140). Here we have the most intimate details of an "operation" to recruit a relatively obscure party handyman and use him as a defector in place. Everything worked wonderfully, including a rendezvous between the agent and his handler in a "safe house" in Moscow. One wonders how many Americans, not necessarily those devoted to the thrillers of international espionage, would believe that any foreign intelligence service could maintain a "safe house" in Moscow. But this technical *gaffe* is no more ridiculous than all the rest of the story is untrue. There is nothing about it which even approximates fact.

How such tales get started is hard to explain on any grounds other than a writer's willingness to fabricate for attention or just for kicks. How they get better in the telling is easier.

Consider for example the Tully fantasy relating to the undercover heroine with the wooden leg (p. 155). In real life this story starts with a real woman who did have a prosthetic leg and who served in the secret operations part of OSS during World War II. In the spring of 1944, several weeks before the landings of 6 June, she was secretly taken across the Channel on a small surface craft and put ashore. She lived and worked the life of a clandestine agent. Her courage and her skill became something of a legend in OSS and as security wraps dropped from wartime stories this one came out into the open and with a few dramatic changes. The legend began to have it that she had gone through jump training in the UK and then had parachuted into France. When Richard and Gladys Harkness told their version in the *Saturday Evening Post* they portrayed her not merely as a parachutist but as a CIA employee who had jumped into postwar Europe. As they wrote it: "There are feminine operatives in the undercover branch of CIA— and good ones too—as well as research workers. One woman, who has a wooden leg, jumped into enemy territory at least twice." Look at this closely. Your first impression probably was that as a postwar operative she jumped

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twice into enemy (i.e., Soviet Bloc) territory. A second reading will show you that this is not necessarily so, and that as the Harknesses have written it it could mean either this or World War II enemy territory. Now comes Mr. Tully who, as has been indicated, had something more than a passing familiarity with the Harkness articles. He writes, "Notable among these feminine [CIA] operatives is a woman with a wooden leg who has parachuted into enemy territory twice and *once was forced to shoot her way out of a trap in West Berlin* [emphasis added]. CIA has no worries about female courage." The ambiguity is now dispelled. It has to be after World War II and the enemy territory has to be Bloc territory, for there was no West Berlin until well after V-E day.

Mr. Tully often yields to this kind of temptation, as for example when he embellishes a sentence from Richard Helms's testimony before a Senate Committee.⁷ Mr. Helms had made reference to a manual which the Soviets had issued for the guidance of their propagandists; he called it just that, yet when Mr. Tully borrows the information, the manual has become "*secret*." The italics are Mr. Tully's.

The great bulk of literature classified as non-fiction lies somewhere between the scholarly treatise with its footnotes, citations, bibliography, etc., and the sober essay which dispenses with learned paraphernalia but strives no less ardently for objective truth. The great bulk of the non-fiction we read is a considerable contribution to wisdom, for what it may lack in exactness or detail it makes up for in good generalization and readability. Many of Mr. Tully's reviewers—even Jack Raymond—have spoken of the interesting way the author writes. No one can blame a writer for trying to write a book that will sell.

Where blame may be attached to this kind of writing, however, is where it professes to be something that it isn't—where, for example, the author, by an overindulgence in name-dropping, endeavors to convey that he has done more work, been more places, talked to more people, thought more deeply than is actually the case. If an author is making a hasty set for the best-seller list he well knows the magic recipe in that old cookbook of non-fiction. Pick a subject in the

⁷ See footnote 3, p. A8.

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public eye which for reasons of state must have as little publicity as possible; write up the subject in a manner to catch the public eye; give it a seeming profundity with a wealth of however specious detail; give it a texture of authority by seeming to have talked with all of the important actors and to have read the important books. Make up a frosting of lurid anecdote, and serve with a fanfare.

Some Debts of Gratitude

Consider Mr. Tully's use of attributed sources of information if you have any doubt as to which class of book his falls into. To begin with, there is the little note up front in which the author acknowledges "a considerable debt of gratitude to . . . [Mr.] Salinger . . . [Mr.] Dulles, Colonel Grogan . . . [Senator] Mansfield . . . Assistant Secretary Roger Tubby . . . Assistant Secretary Sylvester, McGeorge Bundy . . . and Roger Hilsman, Jr., director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department." This is the end of the acknowledgement. You will note that Mr. Tully does not go on to say what perhaps a million authors have said before him, namely: I am grateful to these gentlemen; they have been very helpful, but I want everyone to know that the sentiments in this book are my own and I take full responsibility for them. It so happens that most, if not all, of the gentlemen mentioned have noticed this omission and with considerable displeasure. A number of them have taken the matter up with the publishers. They have objected to the implication that they were of service to Mr. Tully and that the sentiments he expresses in the book may be ascribed to them. Printings of the book subsequent to the first omit the acknowledgement.

Inside the book Mr. Tully lards his text with something like 200 references to the written or spoken utterances of various authorities. The unsuspecting reader would be led to think that Mr. Tully had done quite a piece of research, that he had ransacked the whole spectrum of available literature from the most solid to the most dubious, and that he had done a fairly careful job of evaluating his sources. It would be difficult to establish that this was not in fact Mr. Tully's intent. It is not at all difficult to say that if Mr. Tully had been completely honest with his audience, his book would never have been published.

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A little scurrying around will indicate that of the roughly two hundred sources which he cites he probably consulted first hand about twenty. Maybe this figure is high. The other hundred and eighty are sources which a few of the twenty have themselves cited and used; Mr. Tully's contact with them is at second hand. Almost invariably Mr. Tully perpetuates any errors or liberties or misquotations of the first quoter. For example the quotation from my *Strategic Intelligence*⁸ on page 54 almost certainly is not directly from the book; in all likelihood it was lifted from the Fred J. Cook issue of *The Nation*.⁹ It is worth noting that this passage consists of five sentences, four from page 197 of the book, the last from page 200. When Cook used them he employed the printer's device (. . .) to indicate ellipses. Even so, he did mild violence to the intended meaning. Tully dropped the dots and makes it seem as if the last sentence followed exactly on the heels of the next to last.

All of the learned quotations from the foreign press in chapters 4 and 10 are from the transcript of the Helms testimony. All of the rich array of sources in the chapter on the U-2 incident are the ones the NBC researchers dug up and incorporated into Chet Huntley's NBC White Paper No. 1.¹⁰ The sources quoted in the Cuba chapter (17) first appeared in the articles of Fred J. Cook and Tad Szulc.¹¹ And so on and so on.

So much for the materials which Mr. Tully almost certainly did not see first hand. How about those he did? These fall neatly into two categories: the ones with which he acknowledges an acquaintance and those with which he does not.

Take the first category. Mr. Tully refers to the Helms testimony six times, the Truman *Memoirs* four times, the long Cook article three times, H. H. Ransom's book twice.¹² These sources of information are important ones. See now how he uses them. Take the case of Fred Cook. The three references appear on pages 60, 61, and 66, and the reader will perceive

⁸ Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

⁹ 24 June 1961, Special Issue.

¹⁰ 29 November 1960 (telecast).

¹¹ "Anatomy of a Failure," *Look*, 18 July 1961.

¹² Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

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that Mr. Tully is indebted to Mr. Cook for material encompassed in some 10 lines. Little does the reader know that Mr. Tully has actually drawn upon Cook some 25 times without any references whatsoever and has cribbed some four or five hundred lines almost verbatim. This amounts to, let's say, 15 pages or about five percent of his book. If you don't believe me, read the succeeding parallel passages as a sample.

MR. COOK

(p. 548.) The natural resources of [Iran] include an estimated 13 per cent of the world's oil reserves. This liquid treasure . . . long had been exploited by British interests.

Baron Reuter, founder of the British news service that still bears his name, had received in 1872 a concession that gave him practically a monopoly over Iranian industry. . . .

It seems worthy of note that Frank C. Tlarks, one of Allen Dulles' fellow directors in the Schroeder banking enterprises, served also as a director of Anglo-Iranian Oil and that Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York legal firm in which the Dulles brothers were such prominent partners, was the long-time legal counsel of Anglo-Iranian Oil. . . .

The huge financial interests of the West virtually boycotted Iranian oil.

Mossadegh tried to make deals with smaller, independent American companies to work the Iranian fields, but the State Department frowned on such free enterprise. The international oil cartel held firm—and Iran lost all its oil revenues. . . .

MR. TULLY

(p. 91.) Iran's resources include an estimated 13 per cent of the world's oil reserves, and as early as 1870 this mouth-watering fact had come to the attention of British interests.

In that year, the Baron Reuter, founder of the news service which still bears his name, obtained a concession that gave him a monopoly over Iranian industry. . . .

It also has been brought out that Frank C. Tlarks, one of Dulles' fellow directors in the Schroeder banking empire, was a director of Anglo-Iranian Oil, and that Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York law firm in which Dulles and his brother, John Foster, were partners, was the legal counsel for Anglo-Iranian Oil. . . .

Iranian oil was virtually boycotted.

Mossadegh promptly tried to swing some deals with smaller, independent companies to work the Iranian fields, but the State Department gave these companies little encouragement—which is to say it told them "hands off." Meanwhile, Iran was losing its oil revenues and going broke.

CPYRGHT

MR. COOK

MR. TULLY

(p. 533.) John Foster Dulles testified "We had no advance information of *any kind* [regarding the Israeli attack on Egypt]. The British-French participation also came as a complete surprise to us."

(p. 548.) CIA swung at once into a "crash" program designed to provide the necessary information.

The instant Dulles got the word of Stalin's death, he began sending out orders to CIA agents and undercover men scattered throughout the world.

He demanded from them information on what to expect, morale behind the iron curtain, arms shipments, troop movements, purges.

Before long, detailed reports began to pour in. . . . Dulles and the experts in his analysis section in CIA headquarters sifted reports and studied their voluminous files on Malenkov and the men most closely associated with him.

(p. 554.) Gehlen is a product of the German Reichswehr, a life-long professional soldier . . .

(p. 109.) In Foggy Bottom, Secretary of State Dulles would say, "We had no advance information of *any kind* . . . The British-French participation also came as a complete surprise to us." . . .

(p. 149.) Dulles immediately . . . set in motion the machinery needed to obtain a "crash" estimate of the changed world situation.

Orders went out to CIA agents and secret operatives all over the world and to other government agencies with listening posts abroad.

He wanted to know as soon as possible what diplomatic or military moves to expect, information on troop movements, purges and arms shipments, the condition of morale behind the Iron Curtain.

Reports poured into CIA headquarters all night . . . Dulles and his experts, flanked by experts from other intelligence agencies, pored over the reports and studied the bulging files on Malenkov and the other men in and out of the Politburo who were likely to help him wield his power.

(p. 156.) Reinhold Gehlen is a life-long professional soldier,

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MR. COOK

MR. TULLY

The son of a publisher, he is quiet and scholarly in manner, but he speaks in the terse, clipped tones of a man long accustomed to command.

He joined the Reichswehr in 1920; he fought in the invasions of Poland and France;

and when the Russian war broke out, he was transferred to the Eastern Front where, in April, 1942, he was selected to head the German Army's key new intelligence section. . . .

With the collapse of the Hitler regime, Gehlen saw to it that he got captured by the Americans. . . .

Take the case of Richard Helms. Giving Mr. Tully the break, one may say that his six references to Helms account for some 40 lines. There are another 60 lines with respect to which Mr. Tully writes in such a way as to convey the impression that he and Helms spontaneously just happened to find the same material at the same time. You will find what I am talking about on pages 46 and 47. There are yet another full 100 lines (pp. 142-144) taken from Helms and not faintly attributed to him.

Take the case of Mr. Truman. The first mention of the Truman *Memoirs* comes on page 183 of Tully. Yet at the top of his page 180 appear these two sentences: "CIA warned that at any time the North Koreans might decide to change from

de- spite his early background as the son of a German publisher and a youthful frequenter of literary salons. From that early background he acquired a quiet and scholarly manner; from his service in the Reichswehr he developed the terse and precise tones of the commanding officer.

He had joined the Army in the decrepit days of 1920 but stayed with it to fight in the invasions of Poland and France when the misery of the Twenties seemed worthwhile.

When the Russian war broke out he was transferred to the Eastern Front, where in April, 1942, he was named head of the German Army's Intelligence Section . . .

When the war ended and the Hitler regime collapsed, Gehlen conveniently—for both sides—was captured by the Americans.

Book by Andrew Tully

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isolated raids to full scale attack. But, like CIA reports on other danger spots throughout the world, there was no information on when such an attack would take place." I invite the reader to compare these with the following from II, 331 of the Truman *Memoirs*. "Throughout the spring the Central Intelligence reports said that the North Koreans might at any time decide to change from isolated raids to a full-scale attack. The North Koreans were capable of such an attack at any time, according to the intelligence, but there was no information to give any clue as to whether an attack was certain or when it was likely to come."

Then six and a half pages after Mr. Tully's first reference to the Truman *Memoirs* appears what follows in the right-hand column, carrying no hint of its origin, evident on the left.

MR. TRUMAN (II)

(p. 372.) On October 20, the CIA delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power.

The State Department's reaction to this report was to suggest that General MacArthur issue a statement to the United Nations that he did not intend to interfere with the operations of the Suiho and other power plants.

The Joint Chiefs said that such an announcement would be undesirable from a military point of view. . . . General MacArthur felt . . . that he did not wish his hands tied in such a manner, and the statement was therefore not issued.

MR. TULLY

(p. 190.) On October 20, CIA handed President Truman a memorandum which said it had reports the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power.

From the State Department came a suggestion that General MacArthur issue a statement to the United Nations that he did not intend to interfere with the operation of the Suiho and other power plants.

But both the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur opposed such a move from the military point of view and it was dropped.

And seven pages after, this one:

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MR. TRUMAN

MR. TULLY

(pp. 376-377.) The Central Intelligence Agency also now supplied me with an estimate of the situation based on their sources of information. It reported that there might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might stop the United Nations advance and actually force the United Nations forces to withdraw to defensive positions further south.

The estimate concluded by pointing to one inescapable fact: With their entry into Korea, the Chinese Communists had staked not only some of their forces but also their prestige in Asia.

It had to be taken into account that they knew what risks they were taking; in other words, that they were ready for general war.

Mr. Tully handles H. H. Ransom's book and *Newsweek* with similar shabbiness. Here are a few examples of material used without reference to source.

MR. RANSOM

(p. 45-48.) Even though neglected as an important function of government by the United States, the concept of intelligence and of its importance to the strategy of any operation, civil or military, is as old as society itself.

The Bible records that Moses was instructed to send what in effect were intelligence agents "to spy out the land of Canaan."

(p. 191.) CIA was ready with its own estimate, which was a grave one. General Smith reported that there might be as many as 200,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might stop the UN advance and perhaps force the UN troops to withdraw to defensive positions.

Smith called one fact inescapable. It was that with their entry into the Korean War, the Chinese Communists had staked not only their armed forces but also their prestige in Asia.

Presumably they knew the risks they were taking, that is, the danger of a general war.

MR. TULLY

(p. 8.) Respectable or not, espionage is almost as old as man himself and over the centuries it has been a valuable instrument in the hands of military leaders and ambitious rulers.

Moses discovered its value when, according to the Bible, he sent his agents "to spy out the land of Canaan."

CPYRGHT MR. RANSOM

MR. TULLY

In the sixth century, B.C., Sun Tzu, a Chinese military theorist, wrote in *On the Art of War*, "... what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."

The noted Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, also gave intelligence high credit. He wrote in the Sixth Century, B.C., that "what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge."

In the Mongol invasion of Europe during the thirteenth century, Subotai, a disciple of Genghis Khan, utilized the well-organized intelligence system of the Mongols in his spectacular advances westward. As one authority has noted, "Whereas Europe knew nothing about the Mongols, the latter were fully acquainted with European conditions, down to every detail, not excepting the family connexions of the rulers." *...

The Mongols who overran Europe in the Thirteenth Century depended on a well-knit intelligence service to gather an abundance of information which Michael Prawdin in his *The Mongol Empire* reported included even "the family connexions of the ruler." Meanwhile, "Europe knew nothing about the Mongols."

* Michael Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire*, London, G. Allen, 1940.

The Elizabethan intelligence system was the highly personalized domain of the Queen's principal State Secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham. He developed to a high degree the art of foreign intelligence, utilizing his personal fortune as well as official financial provisions to maintain several score agents in foreign lands. Walsingham's motto was "Knowledge is never too dear," and he concerned himself not only with his spy network but with the codes and ciphers by which vital information was secretly communicated.

As Europe was emerging from the darkness of the Middle Ages, Queen Elizabeth I enjoyed the services of a really top-notch intelligence operator, Sir Francis Walsingham. State Secretary Walsingham's motto was "knowledge is never too dear," and he spent a considerable portion of his private fortune to finance an espionage network which included an elaborate system of codes and ciphers.

CPYRGHT

MR. RANSOM

(p. 103.) A good example of the interdependence of agencies within the intelligence community is provided by the process in which these National Intelligence Surveys are produced. . . .

Its content and format are determined by the National Intelligence Survey Committee, which is an important subcommittee within the Central Intelligence Agency. . . .

. . . the section . . . dealing with Russian highways is compiled by the Army's Transportation Corps, the section on telephone networks by the Signal Corps, and so on.

Priorities and production schedules for various sections of the NIS come from the NIS Committee, a CIA-chaired committee containing representatives from the various intelligence agencies of government.

(p. 169.) A striking bit of evidence of this [suspicion of the intelligence product] is seen in Admiral Arthur W. Radford's off-hand comment, while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1956. "In general in the intelligence field they tend to err on the safe side," he told a Senate committee. . . . "There is good reason to believe that we normally overestimate Communist capabilities in almost every respect . . . there has been an almost hysterical assumption of great capabilities on the part of the Communists, some of which, in my opinion, do not exist."

MR. TULLY

(p. 241.) . . . Every day there are new examples of the interdependence of the nation's intelligence agencies.

For instance, there is the National Intelligence Survey. . . .

Producing a National Intelligence Survey starts with the National Intelligence Survey Committee, a subcommittee within CIA. This committee sets down what needs to be known and how that information is to be organized.

If it is a survey that seeks a general picture, say, of Poland, the job is a community chore. The Army's Transportation Corps compiles the section dealing with highways, the Signal Corps does the section on telephones.

CIA furnishes data on priorities and production schedules, the FBI chips in with a memo on suspected Polish Communist agents in the United States, the State Department with political and cultural data.

(p. 260.) Sometimes these estimates seem to play it safe by printing a darker picture than exists; sometimes they gravely underestimate the Cold War enemy's capacities and progress. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, always insisted that CIA normally overestimated Communist capabilities "in almost every respect . . . there has been an almost hysterical assumption of great capabilities on the part of the Communists, some of which, in my opinion, do not exist."

And echoing *Newsweek*:

CPYRGH *Newsweek* (May 8, 1961)

Mr. TULLY

(p. 20.) After the passengers left the Russian Aeroflot liner at the field outside Vienna, a ground crew came aboard to clean up and get the plane ready for the return flight.

(pp. 20-21.) A Russian commercial Aeroflot liner had just landed, and the ground crew went aboard to clean up the plane for its return flight.

There was the usual litter—a tattered magazine, paper napkins, the remains of sandwiches, empty bottles—and all went into the trash along with a bent coat hanger and a broken cup. A few hours later the airport garbage concessionaire loaded the trash in his little truck and hauled it away.

As the plane was being spruced up a man in a dark suit approached the airport garbage concessionaire and slipped him a bill. Shortly thereafter the concessionaire picked up the trash from the Soviet plane, loaded it into his truck and hauled it to his station.

Enroute to the dump, he stopped and delivered the box of Soviet trash, which had been kept separate, to a man who was willing to pay for it. The man was not a crazy junk collector; he was an agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

There the man in the dark suit turned up to claim the box in which the Soviet litter had been dumped. . . . He went through the trash: two magazines, paper napkins, an empty bottle, a crust from a sandwich, a broken plate—and a bent coat hanger.

Sifting through the trash, the CIA agent spotted the coat hanger, and remembered it was on his priority list. He picked it out, along with several other items, wrapped them, and left them in an appointed spot—in this case a locker in a busy railroad station.

The man wrapped the coat hanger carefully in brown paper, tied it with a strong cord and walked over to a railroad station. There he deposited his package in a locker. . . .

When the package arrived at the nearest CIA headquarters, the agent's superiors were elated. To them, what seemed like an ordinary coat hanger was more valuable than diamonds.

In Washington, a few days later, the coat hanger was sent along to . . . CIA headquarters. The men who signed a receipt for it were delighted.

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Newsweek (May 8, 1961)

MR. TULLY

CIA knew from scraps of information put together that the Russians were building a powerful long-range bomber. They knew about test flights, numbers of planes in production, and even had photographs of the plane.

They did not know its range or bombload but they did know that shavings from the machining of the wing were remelted and made into a particular type of coat hanger.

At last, the CIA had obtained one. By chemical tests and spectroanalysis, the agency learned exactly what metals were being used in the wing of the plane.

The formula for the alloy was the last piece in the puzzle; with that, CIA's experts in aircraft engineering could tell both the range and bombload of that particular Soviet bomber.

They had been working for months to put together information on a new Soviet long-range bomber. They had found out a number of things about the plane,

but had been unable to get anything on its range or bombload. They did know, however, that shavings from the machinings of the wing were remelted and used to make a special kind of coat hanger.

This, at last, was the coat hanger. By spectroanalysis and chemical tests, experts were able to learn the kind of metal alloy used to make the hanger.

With that formula at hand, CIA knew what the bomber wing was made of, and from there it took only a few more steps to figure out both the range and the bombload of that particular plane.

Some Unacknowledged Debts

What about the second category of sources—the ones he mentions not at all? You will recall the three articles on CIA by Richard and Gladys Harkness which I have mentioned earlier, and the article by Tad Szulc on the Cuban affair in *Look*. You surely did not hear of them in Mr. Tully's book. There is no mention of them, yet from the Harkness articles alone Mr. Tully has plagiarized some 470 lines with relatively little change in wording or sequence of thought. He has plagiarized Szulc similarly to the extent of some 30 to 40 lines. He has further cribbed from an article by J. Edgar Hoover in *This Week* and an article by Dan de Luce which appeared in the Outlook section of the *Sunday Washington Post* of September 19, 1954. He has taken without attribution large sec-

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tions of the text of the Chet Huntley NBC White Paper on the U-2. Let me give you some examples. The first is an old friend.

HARKNESS (part I)

A man with the plump pink cheeks and blue eyes of a typical middle-class German sat on the grassy hilltop overlooking the Red port city of Stettin on the left bank of the Oder River in communist-held Poland.

As he had done every seasonable day of last spring, he basked in the warm April sun while washing down his lunch of dry bread and sausage with a liter of white wine, and watched the birds in the nearby trees, through his field glasses.

Then, rising to leave, he swept his glasses along the piers on the river front below, where freighters were being loaded for the thirty-mile trip northward along the Oder and into the open Baltic Sea.

Returning to his small machine-tool works after the noon hour, the businessman called in his secretary to take dictation.

The letter addressed to a French automobile-parts concern was formal and concise in the stiff manner of German commercial houses. It cited precise specifications for presses his firm was offering for sale to stamp out motorcar fenders.

MR. TULLY

(pp. 62-63.) The first person on stage as this secret drama unfolded was a tall and angular German businessman, newly arrived in Stettin, a port city on the Oder River in Communist Poland, to take over a small machine-tool factory.

During the balmy spring days of April the businessman had made it a habit to pack his lunch in a paper bag and stroll with it to a bucolic hill top overlooking the wharves. Like so many Germans he was a nature lover, and he had with him a pair of field glasses with which he observed the birds in the nearby trees.

From time to time he casually let his glasses sweep along the riverfront piers, where freighters were being loaded for passage into the Baltic Sea and beyond.

One April afternoon, in his little office the German businessman dictated a long and statistic-filled letter to his blond secretary.

Addressed to a French automobile parts concern, it was a stiff missive creaking with precise specifications and references to favorable discounts. It offered presses for the stamping out of motorcar fenders,

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HARKNESS (part I)

MR. TULLY

The price was less than the British could quote. The machines carried the official guarantee of the Ministry of Machine Industry of the Polish People's Republic.

It was a letter that the local Red commissar could approve and did.

Once the letter from Stettin was in the hands of America's espionage and counter-espionage service, it was rushed to a commonplace-looking shop in the arty Montmartre section, where a sign on the window read *Salon de Photographie*.

Behind the front of a simple photographic studio, a CIA microfilm technician went to work.

The agent, squinting through a magnifying glass under bright lights, scraped at each "period" on the typewritten page with a delicate razor-sharp instrument. Finally one black dot came off.

There, scarcely larger than the point of a pin, was a tiny circle of microfilm which had been pasted on the sheet of paper at the end of a sentence.

It had been disguised by the ink of the secretary's typewriter ribbon back in Stettin as a period.

machines that had the official guarantee of the Ministry of Machine Industry of the Polish People's Republic and, besides, were cheaper than the British could offer.

After signing the letter, the businessman gave it back to his secretary so she could carry it to the commissar for approval. Casually the commissar attached his stamp, and the letter went out that evening. . . .

. . . But he forgot business for a while to carry the letter personally to a shabby building in the Montmartre hung with the sign *salon de photographie*.

In the back room of the studio, after the auto-parts man had left, a CIA microfilm expert took over.

Using a magnifying glass under powerful lights, the expert scraped at each period on the typewritten page with a tiny instrument with a razor-like edge. Shortly he was rewarded—one little black dot slid off the paper.

Underneath that black period was what the technician had been looking for—a tiny circle of microfilm barely larger than the point of a pin. It had been pasted to the paper at the end of a sentence

and then disguised by the ink from the secretary's typewriter as she pressed the period key.

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BLACKNESS (part I)

MR. TULLY

The agent, holding his breath lest he blow away the minute speck, used tweezers to carry the film to a photographic enlarger.

The agent removed the minute dot of film with a pair of tweezers and carried the film to the photographic enlarger.

When he emerged from the darkroom, the blownup message was the size of a tea saucer. The words could be read as easily as the words on this printed page.

A short time later he had the finished product in his hand—a square of photographic paper the size of a salad plate with the letters in the blown-up message as large as those in a typewritten letter.

MR. SZULC

MR. TULLY

(p. 78/2.) At the same time, CIA ignored President Kennedy's directives excluding Batistianos . . . from the Liberation Army.

(p. 249.) President Kennedy had issued an order excluding *Batistianos* from the Liberation Army, and in the last days of the preparation for the landing he ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest Masferrer.

But unknown to the President, CIA refused to put into effect Kennedy's *Batistiano* ban.

(p. 80/2.) In Guatemala, the official policy of excluding Batistianos was never put into effect. Artime gave the San Román brothers, former Batista officers, high commands. Other Batistianos were streaming into the camps.

Other former Batista officers, including the San Roman brothers, were given important commands

Now the CIA took the position that the Batistianos were experienced military men and proven anti-Communists, and therefore should not be barred from the "Liberation Army." . . .

because, as CIA explained it, they were experienced military men and, more important, *proven* anti-Communists.

CPYRGHT MR. SZULC

MR. TULLY

Manuel Ray demanded that the Batistianos be weeded out of the anti-Castro army.

Manolo Ray demanded that the Batistianos be weeded out.

(p. 81.) In these final days of preparation, President Kennedy ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest ex-Senator Masferrer.

MR. HOOVER

(p. 22.) . . . and now we showed Hayhanen a curious five-cent piece which had baffled us for nearly four years. A newspaperboy had been given the coin with other change as he was collecting from his Brooklyn customers. It felt light in his hand. He let it fall to the street, and the two halves fell apart to reveal a scrap of film.

The boy turned his hand over to a New York detective. The detective passed it to the FBI. The laboratory had never seen a nickel quite like this one before.

Nor could our experts decode the message written in columns of five-digit numbers on the microphotograph.

MR. TULLY

(p. 233.) . . . but the story had its beginnings on a sultry summer evening in 1953. On that evening a delivery boy for the now defunct *Brooklyn-Eagle* knocked on the door of an apartment . . . He was collecting for the paper.

. . . The boy left the apartment building jingling several coins in his hand. He noticed that one of the coins—a nickel—had a peculiar ring. He rested the coin on a finger; it felt lighter than an ordinary nickel. Then he dropped the coin on the floor and it fell apart. Inside was a tiny photograph, apparently a picture of a series of numbers.

. . . The FBI man asked the detective if he could lay his hands on the coin, and the next day the cop called on the newsboy and traded him a real nickel for the trick coin. In turn, the cop turned over the nickel to the FBI agent.

(p. 234.) . . . The microphotograph inside the nickel appeared to show nothing but ten columns of typewritten numbers, with five digits in each number and twenty-one numbers in most columns. In Washington the experts went to work but were unable to decipher the message.

CPYRGHT

MR. HOOVER

MR. TULLY

(p. 11.) . . . His parents were peasants, but the boy became an honor student in school, with Finnish as his second language. He received a teacher's certificate in September 1939, but when Soviet forces invaded Finland that November, he was conscripted by the NKVD

and sent to the combat zone to translate captured documents and interrogate prisoners.

(p. 11.) In 1948 Hayhanen was brought back to Moscow.

Soviet intelligence had a new job for him, and his fluency in Finnish was the key.

The work would require him to sever relations with his family, learn English, and take special training in photographing documents, as well as encoding and decoding messages.

It was part of the plot that he should go to Valga in southern Estonia for his training—and for a special reason. A family named Maki had lived there and they had a son, American-born in Enaville, Idaho, just Hayhanen's age. . . .

(p. 235.) . . . Hayhanen had started his career as a high school teacher. He had studied the Finnish language and had become fluent in it, and two months after his assignment to a school in the village of Lipitzi he was conscripted by the NKVD, the Soviet's internal secret police.

By that time, in the fall of 1939, the Finnish-Soviet war was on, and Hayhanen was assigned as an interpreter to an NKVD group and sent to the combat zone to translate captured documents and to interrogate prisoners.

(p. 236.) In the summer of 1948, Hayhanen was called to Moscow by the MGB.

The Soviet intelligence service had a new assignment for him—

one which would require him to sever relations with his family, study the English language, and receive special training in photographing documents and in encoding and decoding messages.

Reino Hayhanen was to become Eugene Nicolai Maki, a native of Enaville, Idaho, who had accompanied his Finnish-born father and American-born mother to Estonia in the mid-Twenties, when he was eight years old. . . .

CPYRGHT MR. HOOVER

MR. TULLY

Reino Hayhanen returned to Finland in July 1949, this time in his new identity of Eugene Maki. For two years he lived in a series of Finnish communities working quietly as a mechanic and manual laborer, establishing a character.

Then in the summer of 1949 he entered Finland as Eugene Nicolai Maki, an American-born laborer. He lived in Turku for four years to establish his identity. . . .

He met Hanna Kurikka and married her without revealing his Soviet origin.

But he did take a wife, Hanna Kurikka, who knew him only as Eugene Maki, a pretty fair plumber and a good dancer.

. . . On July 3, 1951, he called at the United States Legation in Helsinki where he displayed Maki's birth certificate from the State of Idaho. In July 1952, a United States passport was duly issued.

In July 1951, Hayhanen visited the United States Legation in Helsinki where he displayed a birth certificate from the State of Idaho which showed he was born in Enaville on May 30, 1919. . . . He got the passport about a year later . . .

NBC White Paper

(p. 3.) . . . This is a U-2, filmed by NBC with special permission at the place of its birth, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, California.

(p. 4.) Here is the man who designed it, Lockheed Vice-President, Kelly Johnson.

Back in 1953 and 1954, we were studying ways and means of making fighter airplanes like the F104 go higher and further than they did at that time. As we went further and further into these studies, it soon became apparent that it would take an entirely new kind of aircraft to do the job that we wanted done.

From this came the U-2.

MR. TULLY

(pp. 113-114.) The story of the 10-10 Reconnaissance Detachment began back in 1953 when the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation of Burbank, California, instructed its engineers to design an airplane that would go higher and farther than the F104 went at that time. It shortly became apparent that it would take an entirely new kind of aircraft to do the job.

A designer named Kelly Johnson went to work and came up with the U-2. It was a plane that was like a glider with a jet engine.

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NBC White Paper

MR. TULLY

We made a wing that had a very long span—over eighty feet. The wing had to carry the whole weight of the aircraft and still be very, very light. It had to be designed not only to hold a great amount of fuel,

but it was designed so the wing tip acted as part of the landing gear. On the take off we invented what we called the pogo landing gears. These stick into sockets in the wing, and rest on the ground and keep the airplane level in take off.

The plane he flies will range as high as 90,000 feet—17 miles above the earth—far above the operating ceiling of any other jet and during the eight hours it can stay aloft, the U-2 will half fly, half glide for nearly four thousand miles.

The pilot of a U-2 must spend an hour-and-a-half before take-off relaxing and breathing pure oxygen in order to prepare himself for high altitude conditions.

His helmet is airtight and sealed to his body by a cork ring; he can, therefore, neither eat nor drink before—or during a flight. A long flight may keep the pilot sealed up for more than eight hours.

After such a voyage, he will emerge hungry and thirsty from his cramped cockpit, his skin chafed and raw from the tight fitting suit and helmet.

The wing span was more than eighty feet, and although the wing was extremely light it was designed to carry the whole weight of the aircraft including a large amount of fuel.

In addition, it was necessary for stability's sake on takeoffs to make the wing tip a part of the landing gear. This was done by attaching what Johnson called a "pogo"—a wheel on a stick—to each wing tip.

(p. 114.) . . . It ranged as high as ninety thousand feet—seventeen miles above the earth—and during the eight hours it could stay aloft it could half fly and half glide for nearly four thousand miles.

Before takeoff, the pilot had to spend an hour and a half relaxing and breathing pure oxygen in order to prepare himself for high altitude conditions.

His helmet was airtight and sealed to his body by a cork ring, which meant he could neither eat nor drink before or during a flight. Often when a pilot was in the air for as long as eight hours,

he landed in a state of physical exhaustion, his body chafed and raw from the tight fitting suit and helmet and burning with thirst.

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If you were to tot up the lines of his book which were taken without direct attribution to sources which Mr. Tully mentions in some other context and the lines he more grossly plagiarizes from writers he mentions not at all, you could account for perhaps as much as a third of the book. Then if you will start another census on a clean sheet of paper, where irrespective of source you take account of the childish fabrications and so-called background material which is full of errors, contradictions, and omissions and which has no direct bearing whatever on CIA, you might get up towards the fifty percent mark. One of the tasks left then is to look at the remaining half, or at least one very interesting part of it.

Mr. Tully Sits in Judgment

If there is a thesis in the book it would run like this: CIA violates "its mandate by trespassing on policy making"; (p. 62) and entirely on its own it has meddled in the internal affairs of foreign nations (pp. 52, 55). When it meddles it generally does so with local talent. These local agents are not merely anti-Communists, they are extreme rightists "that stole everything [they] could lay hand on" (p. 89) or "elegant footpads" (p. 200), sometimes "indolent" to boot (p. 219); one is an ex-Nazi (Chapter 11). CIA avoids contact with anyone with a leftist tinge.¹⁸ The result has been a long list of unsavory characters connected with it. CIA also has embarked upon high risk adventures—the U-2 intrusions and possible war with the USSR, support of Chiang Kai-shek and possible war with Communist China. ". . . After Cuba it was obvious that something had to be done to curb CIA's *free wheeling* [emphasis added] operations, especially in the political-military area." (p. 265)

Time after time the reader is given the impression that the Agency is in fact an insulated pocket of power and irresponsibility, that it hides behind a screen of secrecy, is housed in a vast building, spends up to a billion dollars a year, and goes its own sweet way. As these sentences of repeated derogation take their place by the side of others conferring equally misinformed praise, the light begins to dawn. Apparently Mr.

¹⁸ "never supporting anybody to the left of McKinley," Mr. Tully said in one of his radio appearances (WMCA, New York, 8 January 1962).

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Tully is saying that all those activities which are not pure intelligence gathering and intelligence processing are beyond the CIA charter, that even though these activities may have grave foreign policy implications they are nevertheless embarked upon without so much as the by-your-leave of legitimate foreign policy makers. If this is in fact what Mr. Tully is getting at one cannot regard him as a very sophisticated student of the federal government.

Does he really believe that it is CIA that shapes the foreign policy of the United States? Does he really believe that the penchant of the U.S. government to go along with or support men such as the ones he mentions and others like Franco, Salazar, Sarit, Diem, and Rhee is, or was, something dictated by the Agency? Does he really believe that the U.S. government's chilliness to left-wingers like Arbenz, Mossadegh, and Souphannouvong derives from what he twice referred to in broadcasts as CIA's "anti-Communist fetish"? In his mind is there no notion of how foreign policy gets made? Does he think that decisions as basic as the ones he discusses are forced through or slipped past the President, the National Security Council, and the other powerful instruments of policy formulation? Does he think they come about by some youthful CIA officer down the line starting a game of cops and robbers—"free-wheeling," as he calls it?

By "free-wheeling" I take it that Mr. Tully means what a man does when he disobeys instructions or exceeds his authority or, lacking instruction, acts imprudently or brashly. A great many officers of the U.S. government have free-wheeled in the past and will in the future. Mr. Tully, indeed a lot of people, could name a number of otherwise admirable men in our civil, military, and foreign services who have free-wheeled and are now in safe dull jobs or premature retirement. If Mr. Tully can name any free-wheeling CIA operatives the Director of Central Intelligence would certainly like to know who they are so that he could fire them. If on the other hand Mr. Tully's generalized accusation includes the Director himself and his top lieutenants, then he does not know how the U.S. government works.

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Obviously he cannot mean this. For a close reading of what he has written will indicate that he knows as well as anyone that CIA is an operating arm of the executive branch of the government, that like any other it takes its policy orders from the chief executive and his high-level advisors, that it coordinates its plans with other instrumentalities of the government, that it gets its funds through Congress on the representations of fully-informed subcommittees of the House and Senate. At one point Mr. Tully himself says that the Agency "regularly reports to four subcommittees of the Congress, made up of seventeen senior members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees." (p. 261)

What is he getting at then? I do not think he is getting at anything. I believe something has got at him and what that thing is has little or nothing to do with subject at hand. It was a fever to get into print. This is a malady which often occasions a quick and indiscriminating use of material closest to hand. From the Harkness articles he got a lot of information implying that the Agency was a good thing or perhaps even better than that; from the Cook, Edwards,¹⁴ and Szulc articles he took information showing it all bad and a mile wide. The hasty mixture of these produced a four and a half dollar book with two and a quarter's worth of "you're great" and two and a quarter's worth of "you're terrible." If the resulting inconsistencies and contradictions lay the ailing author open to a charge of childish simple-mindedness, no matter; a higher good has been satisfied: the subject of his book—the Central Intelligence Agency—has been handled with Jovian impartiality.

Idle Gossip and Red Slander

What I have written above is in defense of the proposition that Mr. Tully's book *qua* book is certainly one of the poorest ever written. I would like to go one step further. I find it not only bad but shockingly evil. To begin with, Mr. Tully

¹⁴ Bob Edwards and Kenneth Dunne. *A Study of a Master Spy (Allen Dulles)*. (London: Housmans Publishers and Booksellers and the Chemical Workers' Union, 1961.) Edwards is a left-wing Labour Party Member of Parliament.

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has engaged in a hateful sort of rumor mongering and innuendo.

Take the case of the French generals. On page 53 he says that there is evidence that there were CIA operatives who led the Challe rebels to believe that the United States looked with favor on their adventure. He then evokes CIA's critics (unspecified) who could point out that the Agency was "overly eager to get mixed up in policy making." On his own say-so there was "every reason to believe that some irresponsible CIA men went too far." Sympathetically he explains that "If some CIA agent had sold himself on the view that de Gaulle's Algerian policies would lead to a Communist takeover there, he might have been tempted to indulge in words and actions that would give aid and comfort to those opposed to the de Gaulle policies." A little later, noting that CIA has to know what is going on, he indicates that there is extraordinary difficulty in doing this "*without getting involved*." By this time Mr. Tully has built up a pretty firm impression that the Agency was guilty.

This is the stuff of the middle of the chapter. He then stops talking about the French generals, makes a quick reconnaissance of the Turkish coup of 1960, and resumes in a last paragraph on the generals. "In the French revolt," he writes, "there is good reason to believe that President Kennedy was almost as upset at CIA's international image as he was with the French Foreign Office's pusillanimous dabbling in dangerous gossip." This is a strange sentence: the first half seems to indicate that the President gave credence to the allegations of Agency guilt on the grounds that it had a reputation for this sort of business. In the last half Mr. Tully seems to be saying that both he and the President know these allegations to have been nothing more than "dangerous gossip" from the Quai d'Orsay. In other words they were not true, but, as he goes on to repeat, the Agency had such a bad reputation that people suspected its presence in every international crisis. What are we to conclude: guilty or not guilty? I personally feel that Mr. Tully has it both ways; he has blackguarded the Agency and he has exculpated it. A reader who wants to believe the worst has plenty to comfort him while a defender of the Agency objecting to the hostile innuendo can be silenced

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with the reminder that Mr. Tully himself has dubbed it merely dangerous gossip.

Or take this one on page 30. The topic sentence goes "Stories both weird and shocking are told about CIA." Then comes a story, unattributed but actually written by Westbrook Pegler in the *Washington Times-Herald* of 30 July 1953, setting forth that a retired Marine Corps general allegedly claimed that CIA had attempted to enlist him in a plot to "get" General Douglas MacArthur. Yes, there are weird and shocking stories told of many people and institutions, but before retelling them to a large audience a responsible reporter will usually do some checking about.

Much more harmful is Mr. Tully's whole-souled acceptance of certain myths respecting CIA for which the Communists are originally responsible. It is important to let the sense of the word "myth" sink in. It is of considerable importance in the light of a contretemps between Mr. Tully and Mr. Jack Raymond, who had reviewed the Tully book in the *New York Times* book review section of 28 January 1962. Raymond had incorporated into his article quotes from the letter which Mr. Dulles had written the publishers, saying among other things that some statements in the book were repetitions of Communist propaganda. A few weeks later Mr. Tully responded in the 4 March number of the same publication. His communication ends, adverting to Mr. Dulles's remarks on the book's use of Communist propaganda, with the following pregnant sentences: "Surely we are past the time when all that is necessary to discredit a work is to say that it says what Communists say. The question is not who says what, but whether what is said is so." Mr. Raymond contented himself with a brief reply to the effect that Mr. Dulles's comment on the book, as far as he was concerned, "puts a cloud over it"; but with a little homework he would have had no difficulty whatever in meeting Mr. Tully squarely on the latter's chosen ground. He could demonstrate over and over again that stories Mr. Tully puts forward are not only straight Communist stuff but demonstrably untrue in the bargain.

Take the one on pages 38-39 where a false connection is made between the British banking house bearing the name Schroder and a German banker and early friend of the Nazis

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named Baron Kurt von Schroeder. Mr. Dulles's membership on the Schroder Board of Directors is parlayed into a wholly imaginary connection with the Nazi Baron. Mr. Tully, to be sure, does not press the false point as the Communists do. They make quite a thing of it, going so far as to make Mr. Dulles "the advisor and organizer and . . . godfather of the Nazi regime,"¹⁵ the whole story hanging on the willful confusion of the British Schroder with the German Schroeder. Nevertheless Mr. Tully falls in with the basic error, makes the connection, effects the smear, and then winds up telling us that whatever Mr. Dulles's "critics" [unspecified] have said of "his connection with the Nazi financial angels, there is no reason to believe that he ever was influenced by their childishly hideous theories." But the second half of that sentence does not negate the first.

The internal evidence is convincing that Mr. Tully took this slander from the pamphlet of Bob Edwards and Kenneth Dunne, and it is just as convincing that Edwards and Dunne in turn took it from material acknowledgedly published by the Communists. If Mr. Tully did not know this, he could have found it out with a half an hour's research. One would think that ordinary prudence, if not deference for the character of an important public servant, would have dictated more caution.

In Chapter 12 Mr. Tully goes into the East German riots of 1953 and the Hungarian insurrection of 1956. He implicates CIA in the German affair via the employment of three kinds of source material: (1) *Radio Moscow*, which accused the Americans of using one General Sievert USA for inciting a group of West Germans to infiltrate East Germany and take violent direct action. Mr. Tully feels that CIA would not use "a general in uniform" as its *agent provocateur* and to this extent derogates Radio Moscow (which suffers from "the Soviet's congenital inability to tell the *whole* truth"—emphasis added) as a source. (2) Other "sources [unspecified] with considerable access to the story of what went on behind the scenes indicate that CIA nevertheless had at least a sly finger

¹⁵ See for example, among many such, Ivan Vavra, "The Master of Futility," *Mlada Fronta*, Prague, 15 September 1961.

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in the pie." (3) *Circumstantial evidence*: the rioters, it appears, were so well outfitted with the tools of the professional saboteur's trade that "it seemed indisputable that they were getting their espionage paychecks from CIA's top German spy . . . Gehlen." In other words CIA was guilty; if nothing else, the Agency had put Gehlen up to it. The fact is that CIA had no role in these disturbances. Furthermore, I know of no allegations of guilt prior to the Tully book which do not come originally from the Radio Moscow drivel that he cites plus a number of other Communist pronouncements which accused the "Americans" or "American intelligence." All of this about Gehlen and his operatives began with accusations by the East German government; it was reported as beginning this way in the *New York Times* on 17 November 1953; from there it went to Fred J. Cook, who noted its Communist origin as reported by the *Times*; thence to Mr. Tully who blanks out references to the true origin with the phrase "sources with considerable access to the story . . ."

In the case of the Hungarian insurrection of 1956, Mr. Tully says that CIA accurately predicted the outbreak and almost certainly "managed to smuggle arms to the rebels and generally gave them assistance before the uprising" (p. 167). On the next page he reiterates the second count. It is just as wrong here as it was the first time, but made with somewhat less firmness. For in the span of some twenty lines Mr. Tully has changed his estimate of CIA's foreknowledge of the event from "accurately predicted" to "when [the] day came it caught CIA . . . unawares. . . ." Some of Mr. Tully's difficulties are explained in the welter of conflicting Communist accusation. The Communist outcry went out over the radio and Tass; it was picked up by Western newsmen in eastern Europe; bits of it found their way to the *New York Times* and the wire services, other bits to the *New York Worker*. The Communists had made much of a statement attributed to Mr. Dulles that "we knew in advance of the events in Hungary" because of its important support to the rest of their attack. If CIA knew in advance, all the more reason for its complicity in the outbreak. They then laid into the Agency with every-

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~~thing they had, and their stories were not necessarily consistent.~~

Little more need be said of Mr. Tully's debt to the Communist apparatus which has been doggedly engaged for years in a broad-gauge and systematic attack on CIA. It has gone about this by blackguarding Mr. Dulles, by trying to stir up trouble between the Agency and the State Department and Foreign Service, and by leveling every kind of accusation, usually wholly false, against the Agency through forged documents, planted stories, and all its manifold propaganda channels. And Mr. Tully has fallen for most of it.

There are a good many more places in the book where Mr. Tully comments on CIA's non-intelligence activities; he cites cases in the Middle East, Far East, Africa, and Cuba. In most he is harsh on the Agency, reiterating his charges that it has busied itself in another country's domestic affairs and has used as its chosen instrument an incompetent local of the extreme right. The Communist literature is of course full of the same allegations and the same abusive characterization.

I fully agree with Mr. Tully's very wise remark quoted earlier, "Surely we are past the time when all that is necessary to discredit a work is to say that it says what the Communists say. The question is not who says what, but whether what is said is so." The trouble is that in many cases it is extremely difficult for any one man to say "what is so," and impossible to get half a dozen to agree with his findings. There are bound to be many views of what the situation really was, what were the operative trends within it, what their direction, and what their probable stopping place if left alone.

In all these matters my own views are quite different from those of Mr. Tully. The latter could command my attention if not my respect if I thought that he had sweated them out of his soul after a careful study of the available record. But since most of them are taken ready-made from Fred Cook, Bob Edwards, and others, I am not impressed at all. I reserve a particular spot of disrespect for Mr. Tully's views on the Cuban affair, where, while neglecting the findings of a good number of other and better informed commentators, he

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does a fair job of reproducing Cook except for adding bits from Tad Szulc.

People on our side who dislike the Communists should be aware of one of the penalties of the gullible use of Communist handouts, particularly when these are blasts against the alleged deviltry of Western governments and their instrumentalities. As long as Western listeners and readers are fully aware of the true source of attacks, some of them at least—perhaps many or most—listen or read with a built-in caution. They may even apply an automatic discount rate to words spread via Radio Moscow and Tass. Of this the Communists are well aware and little can please them more than to have an uncritical Western commentator or journalist borrow one of their tall tales, make it his own, and repeat it without attribution to source. From this moment the Communists are relieved of the relatively unremunerative chore of repeating themselves; they can now quote the Western source. And they do. If they can quote one who acknowledges to prominent officers of the U.S. Government “a considerable debt of gratitude,” dropping the names of Dulles, Mansfield, Tubby, Sylvester, Bundy, and Hilsman, they have it made.

When Patrice Lumumba was murdered in the Congo, the Communists gave it one of their biggest plays. Belgian embassies including the one in Moscow were attacked by mobs, there were speeches in the UN, and their propaganda lashed out by many means and in many directions. The United States and the CIA came in for their full share. Now comes Mr. Tully writing (p. 224), “There were reports [nature and source unspecified] at the time that CIA had helped track him [Lumumba] down, but there is nothing on the record to confirm this. If CIA had any hand in the recapture it was only to counsel Mobutu [identified in the chapter as “CIA’s man”] *to continue to treat Lumumba with at least legal consideration to avoid international repercussions*” (emphasis added). Although there is no accusation here, I wonder how Mr. Tully might feel if someone had written this sort of sentence substituting his name for CIA’s. If this had happened surely Mr. Tully could not have been surprised when his enemies began quoting the passage as evidence of his guilt. Would he think he had been smeared or not? Is it entirely

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surprising that the Communists have used these references to the Agency for their own purposes?

The Playback

For example the Peking New China News Agency broadcast the following to Asia in English (16 February 1962):

The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States was the chief criminal behind the murder of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba. This was revealed by a book newly published in the United States entitled "CIA—The Inside Story," according to a New York report.

In a report from its correspondent in the United Nations the New York *Worker* said in its 11 February issue that former CIA Director Allen Dulles' plot to murder Lumumba was dealt with in a sensational book that U.N. correspondents were reading. The author of the book is Andrew Tully, a supporter of the CIA. In a chapter on the Congo he pointed out that Joseph Mobutu, the military commander in Leopoldville who first arrested Lumumba, was a CIA agent. The author said that Mobutu was the CIA's "right man at the right time."

He added that President Joseph Kasavubu of the Congo also "sat at the CIA men's feet." He said that Kasavubu was following CIA advice when he issued his proclamation "deposing" Premier Lumumba. A puppet named Ileo was then put up as "Premier." But the indolent Kasavubu and the inexperienced Ileo were no match for Lumumba, so Mobutu, the CIA man, took over as military dictator and Lumumba was later sent to the killers.

The correspondent of the *Worker* said: "This is a gruesome story of treachery and murder that makes a mockery of the CIA's free world propaganda. And it is also a warning of what the CIA may have in store for Antoine Gizenga."

That the Chinese quoted the New York *Worker* as their intermediate source may have somewhat lessened the impact of their story among the few sophisticated anti-Communist listeners who knew the nature of this publication. But I fear the main impact was the one desired; an outsider, a Westerner, was telling the truth against interest. The Russians a few weeks later (20 March 1962) fed the following in English to their African audience—and they did not refer to the *Worker*:

Printed on one of the pages of the newspaper [reference is to the South African paper *New Age*] is a photograph of Patrice Lumumba. A little lower is a photograph of Allen Dulles, former Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. At first sight one is entirely at a loss to understand why these photographs

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appear together. Indeed, what can there be in common between a staunch fighter for the independence of the Congo and the leader of U.S. spies? The headline in bold type at the top of the page makes everything clear: "The Role of the U.S. Spy Chiefs in the Lumumba Murder Plot."

Yes, they were the ones who played a special role in the death of the former Congolese Prime Minister. An article published on the same page furnishes the facts. Recently a sensational book was published in the United States exposing the role of the CIA in the Congolese plot which ended in the murder of Lumumba. This book, "CIA, The Inside Story," was written by Andrew Tully who drew on material from CIA itself.

The Chinese broadcast cited above goes on to other of Mr. Tully's allegations:

In the book Tully also dealt with the role played by CIA during the counterrevolutionary riot in Hungary in 1956. He said, "It is also a virtual certainty that CIA managed to smuggle arms to the rebels and generally give them assistance before the uprising." The CIA also blew up bridges in socialist lands when it could.

The book said that the overthrow of the Mossadeq government of Iran in 1953 "was an American operation from beginning to end." The job cost plenty of money. Tully stated that "Schwartzkopf (the CIA agent—NCNA) supervised the careful spending of more than 10 million CIA dollars."

The book also tells of the fact that the Arbenz government of Guatemala was overthrown by the CIA with U.S. weapons. Referring to the failure of the U.S. armed invasion of Cuba last year, it said that one of the reasons for the defeat was former CIA Director Allen Dulles' belief that "popular uprisings" would follow the landings in Cuba.

The *Worker* pointed out that the materials of Tully's book were from CIA and State Department sources. Tully said that in writing the book he got aid from Allen Dulles, high CIA official Col. Stanley Grogan, and Director of Intelligence and Research for the State Department, Roger Hilsman, Jr.

Fidel Castro's *Prensa Latina* was on the air with this one in Spanish to Latin America (10 January 1962):

"The Central Intelligence Agency is used to assault people, violate sovereignties, inflame countries, provoke international conflicts, and prepare wars," an editorial of the paper *La Prensa* declares in announcing the appearance of a new volume entitled "The History of the CIA."

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The paper notes that "the book demonstrates with precise data that the CIA is more than a police group, it is an omnipotent ministry, a universal organization that watches and acts, that spies and overthrows governments, that is above the North American laws and beyond the principles of international law."

The book, according to the commentary, lists some of the "achievements" of the CIA: "it overthrew Mossadeq of Iran to punish him for his attempt to nationalize petroleum; it organized the mercenary incursion against the government of Jacopo Arbenz in Guatemala; it favored the return to power of the Nazis in West Germany; [an understandable liberty with Mr. Tully's chapter 11 entitled "CIA's ex-Nazi"] and it planned, financed, and directed the invasion of Cuba in April 1961."

As to Cuba, the Czech publication *Zemedelske Noviny*¹⁶ ran three short articles in which the three following paragraphs occur.

The first step of the CIA was to "unite" the groups of émigrés, which up to then were engaged in a mutual fight for the émigré souls, but primarily for North American dollars, without which they would have found themselves long ago on the dung heap of history as other émigrés did before them. The CIA succeeded in joining under the firm of the so-called "Revolutionary Democratic Front" the real "cream" of the former Batista officers, plantation owners, landowners, businessmen, and some "revolutionaries" whose offended vanity could not bear that the developments in Cuba went the way they did not prophesy.

Several isolated farms in Florida rented or bought by the CIA were transformed into military training centers in which mercenaries of the "liberation army" were trained. Who paid for their training? The CIA and some "American associations with interests in Cuba. Such are the facts as the book "CIA—The Inside Story" presents them. "The highest command" in this "enterprise" was held by Richard M. Bissell, deputy to CIA Director Allen Dulles.

Of course, Andrew Tully can be hardly suspected of communist propaganda when among his "informants" were the director of CIA, Allen Dulles himself, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Tubby, Assistant Secretary for Defense Arthur Sylvester, and special adviser to the President on questions of national security, Bundy. [emphasis added]

¹⁶ Jok, "DDT, The Department of Dirty Tricks intervenes against the freedom of Cuba" (Prague) 15, 17 & 18 April 1962

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The East Germans broadcast in Kurdish to Iran on 18 January 1962:

Recently an American reporter, Andrew Tully, published a book on the subject of the American spying organization and its former Chief, Allen Dulles. This book echoed throughout the world press. Most of what is written in this book is quotations from the officials of the spying organization, the State Department, and the American White House. On the first page of the book the author mentions these officials' names and acknowledges gratitude for the documentary materials which they supplied him. The author of this book has raised the curtain on many events of the world and has disclosed many secrets of the American Central Intelligence Agency. One of the events discussed in the book is the 1953 coup d'état in Iran.

Andrew Tully writes in his book that the American Central Intelligence Agency headed by Allen Dulles became the sole cause of . . . the overthrow of Dr. Mossadeq's government. Following this coup d'état an unfortunate and inauspicious regime, which has only been able to prolong its existence by continuous American aid, came to power.

Later on the author of the book discusses the Battle of Suez and the aggression against Cuba, and states that the American Central Intelligence Agency is guilty in all these events.

The content of the book regarding Iran is nothing new to the people of Iran. Several years ago Nelson Rockefeller, the American oil tycoon, in a letter to Eisenhower explained that the Central Intelligence Agency was the backbone of the Nordad 28 coup d'état. Later on many American newspapers and magazines discussed this matter in detail.

However the importance of this recent book is due to the fact that all the documentary material is supplied by those who are at present government employees in America, and each occupies a sensitive position. For example one of the people upon whom the book bases its coup d'état documentation is Roger Tubby, who is now an Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department. Another one of these people is Bundy who is now an Assistant to U.S. President Kennedy. . . .

The Nelson Rockefeller letter referred to above is the Communist forgery mentioned by Richard Helms and duly noted as such by Mr. Tully (pp. 143-4). I suppose he will not be pleased at the way the East German broadcaster misused his text; perhaps he will understand the better how some of us feel about the straighter playback of other parts of his book.

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The Critics and the Public

How will we account for the sale of this book; for sixteen consecutive weeks it had mention in the best-seller listing of the *New York Times* Sunday book review section. By and large, reviewers have probably contributed something to its success. I have some forty-five notices, not including plugs by bookstores or other advertisements. Of these perhaps ten merit being called full-dress serious reviews and twenty-seven can be called short reviews. The rest are squibs of a few words or a few lines. There is no question that Mr. Tully got a fair to good press. Not one single reviewer spotted his unacknowledged borrowing, though half a dozen did say he had not added much to what was already in the public domain. Warren Unna in the *Washington Post* alone seems to have pinpointed some of his factual errors and went on to indicate he did not think much of the book; Jack Raymond in the *New York Times* book review section is critical and said a few things Mr. Tully did not like, but his review probably piqued more curiosity than it dulled. Patrick Laughlin in the *Phoenix Republic*, Jim Mathis in the *Houston Post*, and Barret Sanders in the *Pittsburgh Press* are aware of the book's general weakness and say as much. There are a half dozen other reviewers who in short notices indicate that they were unfavorably impressed.

At the other end of the spectrum is Edward Le Clair in the *Albany Times Union*, who gives him this accolade: "Working with the cooperation of officials both in and out of CIA Tully has made a major contribution to a general understanding of this important agency. Much that [he] tells us is either unknown or little known to the general public . . . carefully researched facts and a penetrating and well-balanced appraisal . . . highly readable . . ." There is also Frederick Yeiser in the *Cincinnati Enquirer* who interprets Mr. Tully's note of acknowledgement to Mr. Dulles *et al* as evidence that "the book could not have been written without official consent. . . . Patently Tully was given the bitter with the sweet and a free hand in the treatment of the material. In addition the information of public record—and presumably a substantial amount of reliable gossip—provided what he wanted for a story, astonishing as it may seem, based solidly on fact."

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These are the high water marks, but there are another twenty-odd short reviews and squibs that are either on the favorable side or—by confining themselves purely to description of the contents—completely neutral. Thus of the notices of all categories that I have seen the pros and neutrals prevail at something better than two to one.

It is not likely that these notices in themselves account for the book's sale, although those which repeated some of Tully's fantasies unquestionably helped. Nor probably did the adverse ones impede it. There are, as I have said, only a few of these, and not a single one recognizes the book for what it is. Even the most critical often speak of the readability of the prose.

A short version of the book was syndicated in the press, but I rather doubt that this helped its sale. Mr. Tully's radio broadcasts and TV appearances probably helped, but they of course took place after the book had got a good start. The advertising campaign was vigorous and probably one of the two most important reasons for the book's commercial success.

The other reason, and the more important, is the American people's zealousness to keep its government accountable to it and its attraction to "revelations," "inside dope," spies, spying, and international intrigue. After the U-2 and the matter of Cuba there were few in the United States who did not want to know what was going on. CIA was out in the open and not modestly clad. The long Cook article might have satisfied a great many if it had been published in one of the mass circulation magazines. If the Harkness articles had come in 1961 instead of 1954 they too might have done the trick. But as things stood around the year's end there was a wide and understandable curiosity about that secret part of the government which, though being roundly criticized and sometimes praised, was not answering back.

If CIA's secrets are one of the important national resources, they have come through Mr. Tully's processing relatively undamaged. Whatever his aim—and I much doubt the genuineness of the one he has given voice to—he most emphatically has not showed the taxpayer where his "up to a billion dollars a year" has been going. The mischief of Mr. Tully's "revelations" will be felt more deeply by the country as a

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whole than by the specific institution of government he purports to investigate and appraise. CIA will survive his harsh and ill-informed commentary, but it will be quite a while before our enemies stop quoting him as the true and proper source of the calumnies on the United States which they themselves have previously floated.

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